

Model Checking for Coalition Announcement Logic

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What this talk is about

- What agents know and don't know (through the lens of epistemic logic¹)
- The effect of public announcements² on agent's knowledge
- How agents can achieve certain goals by teaming up in coalitions and making joint announcements³
- Model checking for such a framework

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
Example

There are two households, a and b , and an electricity substation c that requires information about how many households consume power. Moreover, it is imperative that individual household's consumption remains unknown.

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
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
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 $(M, w_1) \models \neg K_c p_a.$

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Exactly one of us, a and b , uses electricity, i.e.


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
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
Example Updated



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


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$$(M, w_1)^{ann} \models p_a \wedge \neg p_b, (M, w_1)^{ann} \models K_a p_a, (M, w_1)^{ann} \models K_a p_b, \\ (M, w_1)^{ann} \models K_c((p_a \wedge \neg p_b) \vee (\neg p_a \wedge p_b)).$$

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Definition (Epistemic Model)

An **epistemic model** is a triple $M = (W, \sim, V)$, where

- W is a non-empty set of states,
- $\sim: A \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(W \times W)$ assigns an equivalence relation to each agent,
- $V: P \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(W)$ is the valuation function.

A pair (M, w) with $w \in W$ is called a **pointed model**.

An announcement in a pointed model (M, w) results in an **updated pointed model** $(M, w)^\varphi$ with $W^\varphi = \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket_M$, $\sim_a^\varphi = \sim_a \cap (\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket_M \times \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket_M)$, and $V^\varphi(p) = V(p) \cap \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket_M$.

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Definition (Semantics)

$(M, w) \models p$	iff	$w \in V(p)$
$(M, w) \models \neg\varphi$	iff	$(M, w) \not\models \varphi$
$(M, w) \models \varphi \wedge \psi$	iff	$(M, w) \models \varphi$ and $(M, w) \models \psi$
$(M, w) \models K_a\varphi$	iff	$\forall v \in W : w \sim_a v$ implies $(M, v) \models \varphi$
$(M, w) \models [\varphi]\psi$	iff	$(M, w) \models \varphi$ implies $(M, w)^\varphi \models \psi$

Formula $[\varphi]\psi$ is read as

after a public announcement of φ , ψ holds in the resulting model.

Dual of $[\varphi]$

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We are interested in the following restrictions on announcements:

- Announcements are made by agents
- Agents can only announce what they know
- Coalitions of agents can announce conjunctions of formulas, where each conjunct is a formula known by an agent in the coalition
- Agents outside of the coalitions also make an announcement that can preclude coalition to reach its goal

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Announcements by Coalitions

Coalition Announcement Logic (CAL) allows us to reason about announcements by coalition of agents. This is Public Announcement Logic (PAL) with the following added operators:

$\langle\langle G \rangle\rangle\varphi$: 'there is an announcement by agents from G such that whatever agents $A \setminus G$ outside of the coalition announce, φ holds,'

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Let ψ_G be a shorthand for a formula of the type $K_a\varphi_a \wedge \dots \wedge K_b\varphi_b$, where $a, \dots, b \in G$, and $\varphi_a, \dots, \varphi_b$ are formulas of epistemic logic. For example, ψ_G may be $K_ap \wedge K_b(p \rightarrow q)$ for $G = \{a, b\}$.

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
$$\begin{aligned}(M, w) \models \llbracket G \rrbracket \varphi & \text{ iff } \forall \psi_G \exists \chi_{A \setminus G} : (M, w) \models \psi_G \rightarrow \langle \psi_G \wedge \chi_{A \setminus G} \rangle \varphi \\ (M, w) \models \langle \llbracket G \rrbracket \varphi \rangle & \text{ iff } \exists \psi_G \forall \chi_{A \setminus G} : (M, w) \models \psi_G \wedge [\psi_G \wedge \chi_{A \setminus G}] \varphi\end{aligned}$$

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
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
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Definition (Model Checking for CAL)

Model-checking problem for CAL: given a pointed epistemic model (M, w) and a formula φ , determine whether $(M, w) \models \varphi$.

- Epistemic Planning: is there a strategy for a coalition such that some information is made known without revealing too much?
- Verification of Distributed Protocols: communication over a channel with an eavesdropper
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Model Checking for CAL: General Idea

- Problem: implementing the truth definition directly requires checking results of announcing infinitely many formulas
- Hint: models for model checking are finite; for every agent there are finitely many ways to modify a model, and the same model update is a result of infinitely many announcements
- Solution: systematically define ‘exemplar’ announcements by an agent for every possible model update⁴

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Model Checking for CAL: Machinery I

Given a finite model (M, w) , distinguishing formula δ_w is constructed recursively as follows:

$$\delta_w^{k+1} ::= \delta_w^0 \wedge \bigwedge_{a \in A} \left(\bigwedge_{w \sim_a v} \widehat{K}_a \delta_v^k \wedge K_a \bigvee_{w \sim_a v} \delta_v^k \right),$$

where $0 \leq k < |W|$, and δ_w^0 is the conjunction of all literals that are true in w , i.e. $\delta_w^0 ::= \bigwedge_{w \in V(p)} p \wedge \bigwedge_{w \notin V(p)} \neg p$.

Theorem

Every pointed model (M, w) is distinguished from all other non-bisimilar pointed models (M, v) by some distinguishing formula $\delta_w \in \mathcal{L}_{EL}$.

A distinguishing formula for a set of states S is

$$\delta_S ::= \bigvee_{w \in S} \delta_w.$$

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
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
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A Modified Example




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
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
Agent's a equivalence class (announcement $K_a p_a$)

A Modified Example



Agent's b equivalence class (announcement $K_b \neg p_b$)

A Modified Example



equivalence class \cap equivalence class = equivalence class
(announcement $K_a p_a \wedge K_b \neg p_b$)

Definition (Strategies)

A **strategy** X_a for an agent a in a finite model (M, w) is a union of equivalence classes of a including $[w]_a$. Let denote **the set of all available strategies** of a as $S(a, w)$. **Coalition strategy** X_G is defined as $\bigcap_{a \in G} X_a$ for all $a \in G$. The set of available strategies for a coalition of agents G is denoted as $S(G, w)$.

A distinguishing formula δ_{X_G} for X_G is $\bigvee_{w \in X_G} \delta_w$.

Given that the number of strategies is always finite, we can a new finitary definition to the coalition announcement operator:

$$(M, w) \models \langle\!\langle G \rangle\!\rangle \varphi \text{ iff} \\ \exists X_G \in S(G, w) \forall X_{A \setminus G} \in S(A \setminus G, w) : (M, w)^{X_G \cap X_{A \setminus G}} \models \varphi$$

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Model Checking for CAL: The Algorithm

Algorithm $mc(M, w, \varphi_0)$

case φ_0

p : if $w \in V(p)$ then return *true* else return *false*;

$\neg\varphi$: if $\neg mc(M, w, \varphi)$ then return *true* else return *false*;

$\varphi \wedge \psi$: if $mc(M, w, \varphi)$ and $mc(M, w, \psi)$ then return *true*
else return *false*;

$K_a\varphi$: for all $v \sim_a w$

if $\neg mc(M, v, \varphi)$ then return *false*;

return *true*

Model Checking for CAL: The Algorithm

Algorithm $mc(M, w, \varphi_0)$

case φ_0

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if $\neg mc(M, v, \varphi)$ **then return false**;
return true

$\langle \psi \rangle \varphi$ **if** $\neg mc(M, w, \psi)$ **then return false**, **else** compute the ψ -submodel of M and **return** $mc(M^\psi, w, \varphi)$.

$\llbracket G \rrbracket \varphi$: compute $(\|M\|, w)$ and sets of strategies $S(G, w)$ and $S(A \setminus G, w)$

- for all** $X_G \in S(G, w)$
 - $check = true$;
 - for all** $X_{A \setminus G} \in S(A \setminus G, w)$
 - if** $\neg mc(\|M\|^{X_G \cap X_{A \setminus G}}, w, \varphi)$ **then**
 $check = false$
 - if** $check$ **then return true**
- return false.**

Complexity of The Model Checking Problem

Theorem

The model checking problem for CAL is PSPACE-complete.

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Conclusions and Further Research

- PSPACE is a manageable complexity
- We can use model checking to verify consequences of coalition announcements (for example, communication protocols, or data collection)
- We can also use it to produce strategies (the right announcements to make) given the properties that should hold after the announcement
- The satisfiability problem for CAL is **undecidable**⁵. Finding its decidable fragments is an open problem

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Thank you for attention!

Let two models $M = (W, \sim, V)$ and $M' = (W', \sim', V')$ be given. A non-empty binary relation $Z \subseteq W \times W'$ is called a *bisimulation* if and only if for all $w \in W$ and $w' \in W'$ with $(w, w') \in Z$:

- w and w' satisfy the same propositional variables;
- for all $a \in A$ and all $v \in W$: if $w \sim_a v$, then there is a v' such that $w' \sim_a v'$ and $(v, v') \in Z$;
- for all $a \in A$ and all $v' \in W'$: if $w' \sim_a v'$, then there is a v such that $w \sim_a v$ and $(v, v') \in Z$.

- The *quotient model* of M with respect to some relation R is $M^R = (W^R, \sim^R, V^R)$, where $W^R = \{[w] \mid w \in W\}$ and $[w] = \{v \mid wRv\}$, $[w] \sim_a^R [v]$ iff $\exists w' \in [w], \exists v' \in [v]$ such that $w' \sim_a v'$ in M , and $[w] \in V^R(p)$ iff $\forall w' \in [w] : w' \in V(p)$.
- *Bisimulation contraction* of M (written $\|M\|$) is the quotient model of M with respect to the maximal bisimulation of M with itself.
- A model M is *bisimulation contracted* if M is isomorphic to $\|M\|$.
- $(\|M\|, w) \models \varphi$ iff $(M, w) \models \varphi$ for all $\varphi \in \mathcal{L}_{CAL}$.