# Arbitrary Public Announcement Logic

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# We are dealing with S5 models (agents' relation is equivalence)

#### **Public Announcement Logic**

Language of  $\mathscr{PAL} \ni \varphi ::= p |\neg \varphi| (\varphi \land \varphi) |\Box_a \varphi| [\varphi] \varphi$ PAL

Semantics

 $M, s \models [\psi]\varphi \text{ iff } M, s \models \psi \text{ implies } M^*\psi, s \models \varphi$  $M, s \models \langle \psi \rangle \varphi \text{ iff } M, s \models \psi \text{ and } M^*\psi, s \models \varphi$ 

Updated model

Let  $M = (S, \sim, V)$  and  $\varphi \in \mathscr{PAL}$ . An updated model  $M * \varphi$  is a tuple  $(S^{\varphi}, \sim^{\varphi}, V^{\varphi})$ , where •  $S^{\varphi} = \{s \in S \mid M, s \models \varphi\};$ •  $\sim_{a}^{\varphi} = \sim_{a} \cap (S^{\varphi} \times S^{\varphi});$ 

•  $V^{\varphi}(p) = V(p) \cap S^{\varphi}$ .

Van Ditmarsch, Van der Hoek, Kooi. Dynamic Epistemic Logic, Section 4. 2008.

# Axiomatisation of PAL

Axioms of EL  $[\varphi]p \leftrightarrow (\varphi \rightarrow p)$   $[\varphi] \neg \psi \leftrightarrow (\varphi \rightarrow \neg [\varphi]\psi)$   $[\varphi](\psi \land \chi) \leftrightarrow ([\varphi]\psi \land [\varphi]\chi)$   $[\varphi] \square_a \psi \leftrightarrow (\varphi \rightarrow \square_a [\varphi]\psi)$   $[\varphi][\psi]\chi \leftrightarrow ([\varphi \land [\varphi]\psi]\chi)$ From  $\varphi$  infer  $[\psi]\varphi$  **Theorem**. PAL and EL are equally expressive

Theorem. PAL is sound and complete

**Theorem**. Complexity of SAT-PAL is PSPACEcomplete

**Theorem**. Complexity of MC-PAL is P-complete

Van Benthem, Kooi. *Reduction axioms for epistemic actions*, 2004. Lutz. *Complexity and Succinctness of Public Announcement Logic*, 2006. Van Ditmarsch, Van der Hoek, Kooi. *Dynamic Epistemic Logic*, Section 4. 2008.

## **Quantifying Over Updates**



Existence: Having a starting configuration M and a property  $\varphi$  we would like to have, there is an epistemic action that results in configuration N satisfying  $\varphi$ 

## **Quantifying Over Updates**



Universality: Having a starting configuration M satisfying  $\varphi$ , we would like to ensure that all epistemic actions result in some configuration N satisfying  $\varphi$ 

• Verification of functionality and security of a system

Functionality. There is a protocol that allows agents to achieve their goals

• Verification of functionality and security of a system

Security. No matter what agents do, they cannot reach some undesirable state

- Verification of functionality and security of a system
- Use in other DEL-inspired logics, e.g. social networks and awareness

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- Protocol synthesis

**Protocol synthesis.** Given a goal state, provide an action (or their sequence), that takes any give state to the goal

- Verification of functionality and security of a system
- Use in other DEL-inspired logics, e.g. social networks and awareness
- Protocol synthesis
- Capturing the notion of knowability in philosophy

#### Knowability. Every true statement is knowable, in principle

- Verification of functionality and security of a system
- Use in other DEL-inspired logics, e.g. social networks and awareness
- Protocol synthesis
- Capturing the notion of knowability in philosophy
- And so on and so on and so on and so on...

#### Knowability. Every true statement is knowable, in principle



 $\langle ! \rangle \varphi$ : There is a public announcement, after which  $\varphi$  is true



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 $[!]\varphi$ : After all public announcements,  $\varphi$  is true



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There is an announcement such that Asgeir knows the deal, and Bendik and Caroline do not



 $M, s \models \langle ! \rangle (\Box_a \text{deal} \land \neg \Box_b \text{deal} \land \neg \Box_c \text{deal})$  $\varphi := (\spadesuit_b \lor \blacktriangledown_b) \land (\clubsuit_c \lor \blacktriangledown_c)$ 

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 $M, s \models [!]( \blacklozenge_a \lor \spadesuit_a \lor \spadesuit_a)$ 



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Language of APAL

 $\mathscr{APAL} \ni \varphi ::= p |\neg \varphi| (\varphi \land \varphi) | \Box_a \varphi | [\varphi] \varphi | [!] \varphi$ 

Semantics

$$M, s \models [!]\varphi \text{ iff } \forall \psi \in \mathscr{PAL} : M, s \models [\psi]\varphi$$
$$M, s \models \langle ! \rangle \varphi \text{ iff } \exists \psi \in \mathscr{PAL} : M, s \models \langle \psi \rangle \varphi$$

#### Do you notice anything interesting in the definition of semantics?

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$$\begin{split} M, s \models [!]\varphi & \text{iff } \forall \psi \in \mathscr{APAL} : M_s \models [\psi]\varphi \\ [p]\varphi, [\Box_a \diamondsuit_b (p \to q)]\varphi, [[!]\varphi]\varphi \end{split}$$

Why would we restrict the scope of quantification?

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Language of APAL

 $\mathscr{APAL} \ni \varphi ::= p |\neg \varphi| (\varphi \land \varphi) | \Box_a \varphi | [\varphi] \varphi | [!] \varphi$ 

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#### Quantification is restricted to formulas of PAL in order to avoid circularity

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Some validities

$$\begin{array}{ll} \langle \psi \rangle \varphi \to \langle ! \rangle \varphi & [!] \varphi \to \varphi \\ \langle ! \rangle \varphi \leftrightarrow \langle ! \rangle \langle ! \rangle \varphi & \langle ! \rangle [!] \varphi \leftrightarrow [!] \langle ! \rangle \varphi \end{array}$$

#### Quantification is restricted to formulas of PAL in order to avoid circularity

Theorem. PAL and EL are equally expressive

What do you think about APAL versus PAL?

The easy direction.  $\mathcal{PAL} \subseteq \mathcal{APAL}$ : APAL subsumes PAL

The not so easy direction.  $\mathscr{APAL} \subseteq \mathscr{PAL}$ ?

[!] $\varphi$  is quite powerful as it quantifies over formulas with all propositional variables (even those not explicitly present in  $\varphi$ ) and over formulas of arbitrary finite modal depth

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Since PAL = EL, we provide a proof for the case of EL

Consider  $\langle ! \rangle (\Box_a p \land \neg \Box_b \Box_a p)$ 

There is a public announcement such that a learns p and b does not know that a has learned p

Consider  $\langle ! \rangle (\Box_a p \land \neg \Box_b \Box_a p)$ 

Assume that there is a  $\psi \in \mathscr{CL}$  which is equivalent to the given APAL formula

Since  $\psi$  is finite, there must be a  $q \in P$  that does not appear in  $\psi$ 

We will exploit the feature that  $\langle ! \rangle$  still quantifies over formulas with q

Consider  $\langle ! \rangle (\Box_a p \land \neg \Box_b \Box_a p)$ 

Assume that there is a  $\psi \in \mathscr{CL}$  which is equivalent to the given APAL formula



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Consider  $\langle ! \rangle (\Box_a p \land \neg \Box_b \Box_a p)$ 

Assume that there is a  $\psi \in \mathscr{CL}$  which is equivalent to the given APAL formula Contradiction!



In the presented proof, we exploited the feature that  $\langle ! \rangle$  quantifies over all propositional variables

Recall that (!) quantifies over formulas of arbitrary finite modal depth. We will exploit this feature now

Consider  $\langle ! \rangle (\Box_a \neg p \land \neg \Box_b \Box_a \neg p)$ 

Assume that there is a  $\psi \in \mathscr{CL}$  which is equivalent to the given APAL formula

Since  $\psi$  is finite, it has some finite modal depth n

Consider  $\langle ! \rangle (\Box_a \neg p \land \neg \Box_b \Box_a \neg p)$ 

Assume that there is a  $\psi \in \mathscr{CL}$  which is equivalent to the given APAL formula

Since  $\psi$  is finite, it has some finite modal depth n

M

a

 $\{p\}$ 





Consider  $\langle ! \rangle (\Box_a \neg p \land \neg \Box_b \Box_a \neg p)$ 

Assume that there is a  $\psi \in \mathscr{CL}$  which is equivalent to the given APAL formula

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M

$$M, t \models \langle ! \rangle (\Box_a \neg p \land \neg \Box_b \Box_a \neg p)?$$



Consider  $\langle ! \rangle (\Box_a \neg p \land \neg \Box_b \Box_a \neg p)$ 

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M

$$M, t \models \langle ! \rangle (\Box_a \neg p \land \neg \Box_b \Box_a \neg p)?$$



Consider  $\langle ! \rangle (\Box_a \neg p \land \neg \Box_b \Box_a \neg p)$ 

Assume that there is a  $\psi \in \mathscr{CL}$  which is equivalent to the given APAL formula

Since  $\psi$  is finite, it has some finite modal depth n



M

$$\begin{split} M,t \not\models \langle ! \rangle (\Box_a \neg p \land \neg \Box_b \Box_a \neg p) \\ N,s_1 \models \langle \psi \rangle (\Box_a \neg p \land \neg \Box_b \Box_a \neg p) \end{split}$$



State  $s_n$  is unique and allows us to specify uniquely other states

Consider  $\langle ! \rangle (\Box_a \neg p \land \neg \Box_b \Box_a \neg p)$ 

Assume that there is a  $\psi \in \mathscr{CL}$  which is equivalent to the given APAL formula

Since  $\psi$  is finite, it has some finite modal depth n

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 $\{p\}$ 

$$M, t \not\models \langle ! \rangle (\Box_a \neg p \land \neg \Box_b \Box_a \neg p)$$
$$N, s_1 \not\models \langle \psi \rangle (\Box_a \neg p \land \neg \Box_b \Box_a \neg p)$$

 $N \xrightarrow{s a} a \xrightarrow{s_1 b} \underbrace{s_2 a}_{\{p\}} a \xrightarrow{s_3 b} \dots \underbrace{b}_{\{p\}} a \xrightarrow{s_{n-1} a}_{\{p\}} a \xrightarrow{s_n}_{\{p\}} \dots \underbrace{b}_{\{p\}} \dots \underbrace{$ 

State  $s_n$  is unique and allows us to specify uniquely other states

Consider  $\langle ! \rangle (\Box_a \neg p \land \neg \Box_b \Box_a \neg p)$ 

Assume that there is a  $\psi \in \mathscr{CL}$  which is equivalent to the given APAL formula

Since  $\psi$  is finite, it has some finite modal depth n

M

a

 $\{p\}$ 

M and N are 'the same' up to n steps



Cannot find the difference with  $\psi$ !

Theorem. PAL and EL are equally expressive

[!] $\varphi$  is quite powerful as it quantifies over formulas with all propositional variables (even those not explicitly present in  $\varphi$ ) and over formulas of arbitrary finite modal depth

**Theorem.** APAL is more expressive than PAL and EL

There are no reduction axioms for APAL, hence we have to find a proper axiomatisation...

# Axiomatisation of APAL

Language of APAL

 $\mathscr{APAL} \ni \varphi ::= p |\neg \varphi| (\varphi \land \varphi) | \square_a \varphi | [\varphi] \varphi | [!] \varphi$ 

Semantics

$$M, s \models [!]\varphi \text{ iff } \forall \psi \in \mathscr{PAL} : M, s \models [\psi]\varphi$$

Axioms of EL and PAL  $[!]\varphi \rightarrow [\psi]\varphi \text{ with } \psi \in \mathscr{PAL}$ From  $\{\eta([\psi]\varphi) | \psi \in \mathscr{PAL}\}$ infer  $\eta([!]\varphi)$  Infinite number of premises

 $\eta([\psi_1]\varphi) \eta([\psi_2]\varphi) \eta([\psi_3]\varphi) \cdots$  $\eta([!]\varphi)$ 

We call such a rule infinitary

We can prove completeness using the canonical model construction and a Lindenbaum type lemma

**Recall APAL** 

$$\begin{split} M, s \models [!]\varphi & \text{iff } \forall \psi \in \mathscr{PAL} : M, s \models [\psi]\varphi \\ M, s \models \langle ! \rangle \varphi & \text{iff } \exists \psi \in \mathscr{PAL} : M, s \models \langle \psi \rangle \varphi \end{split}$$



Instances of an axiom schema

We can prove completeness using the canonical model construction and a Lindenbaum type lemma

**Recall APAL** 

$$\begin{split} M, s \models [!]\varphi & \text{iff } \forall \psi \in \mathscr{PAL} : M, s \models [\psi]\varphi \\ M, s \models \langle ! \rangle \varphi & \text{iff } \exists \psi \in \mathscr{PAL} : M, s \models \langle \psi \rangle \varphi \end{split}$$



By closure under MP

We can prove completeness using the canonical model construction and a Lindenbaum type lemma

**Recall APAL** 

$$\begin{split} M, s &\models [!]\varphi & \text{iff } \forall \psi \in \mathscr{PAL} : M, s \models [\psi]\varphi \\ M, s \models \langle ! \rangle \varphi & \text{iff } \exists \psi \in \mathscr{PAL} : M, s \models \langle \psi \rangle \varphi \end{split}$$



Add a witness

We can prove completeness using the canonical model construction and a Lindenbaum type lemma

**Recall APAL** 

$$\begin{split} M, s \models [!]\varphi & \text{iff } \forall \psi \in \mathscr{PAL} : M, s \models [\psi]\varphi \\ M, s \models \langle ! \rangle \varphi & \text{iff } \exists \psi \in \mathscr{PAL} : M, s \models \langle \psi \rangle \varphi \end{split}$$



Add a witness

# Axiomatisation of APAL

Axioms of EL and PAL  $[!]\varphi \rightarrow [\psi]\varphi \text{ with } \psi \in \mathscr{PAL}$ From  $\{\eta([\psi]\varphi) | \psi \in \mathscr{PAL}\}$ infer  $\eta([!]\varphi)$ 

**Theorem.** There is a sound and complete infinitary axiomatisation of APAL

**Open Problem**. Is there a finitary axiomatisation of APAL?

# Backstabbing the OP

A logic has the finite model property (FMP) iff every formula of the logic that is true in some model is also true in a finite model

Finitary axiomatisation  $\land$  FMP  $\rightarrow$  Decidability

**Finitary axiomatisation** 

Finding the proof of  $\neg \phi$ 

If successful,  $\varphi$  is not satisfiable

FMP

Looking for a finite model of  $\varphi$ If successful,  $\varphi$  is satisfiable

Urquhart. Decidability and the Finite Model Property, 1981.

# Backstabbing the OP

A logic has the finite model property (FMP) iff every formula of the logic that is true in some model is also true in a finite model

Finitary axiomatisation  $\land$  FMP  $\rightarrow$  Decidability

 $\neg$ Decidability  $\rightarrow \neg$ Finitary axiomatisation  $\lor \neg$ FMP

APAL is undecidable. If we show that APAL has the FMP, then we will know that it is not finitely axiomatisable...

Urquhart. Decidability and the Finite Model Property, 1981.

# No FMP for APAL

[!] $\varphi$  is quite powerful as it quantifies over formulas with all propositional variables (even those not explicitly present in  $\varphi$ ) and over formulas of arbitrary finite modal depth

However, it is not powerful enough to pick out all interesting submodels of a model



#### **Example.** Try removing all states apart from *s* using only propositional announcements

French, Van Ditmarsch, RG. No Finite Model Property for Logics of Quantified Announcements, 2021.

# Back to the OP

¬Decidability  $\rightarrow$  ¬Finitary axiomatisation  $\lor$  ¬FMP

One can also show the lack of the FMP via the arbitrary modal depth way

**Open Problem.** Is there a finitary axiomatisation of APAL?

Kuijer. *Expressivity of Logics of Knowledge and Action*, 2014 French, Van Ditmarsch. *Undecidability for arbitrary public announcement logic*, 2008. Urquhart. *Decidability and the Finite Model Property*, 1981. French, Van Ditmarsch, RG. *No Finite Model Property for Logics of Quantified Announcements*, 2021.

# Overview of APAL

Axioms of EL and PAL  $[!] \varphi \to [\psi] \varphi$  with  $\psi \in \mathscr{P}\mathscr{A}\mathscr{L}$ From  $\{\eta([\psi]\varphi) | \psi \in \mathscr{PAL}\}$ infer  $\eta([!]\varphi)$ 

**Theorem.** APAL is more expressive than PAL

Theorem. APAL is sound and complete

Infinite number of premises

Theorem. SAT-APAL is undecidable

**Open Problem**. Is there a finitary axiomatisation of APAL?

Theorem. Complexity of MC-APAL is PSPACEcomplete

French, Van Ditmarsch. *Undecidability for arbitrary public announcement logic*, 2008. Balbiani, Van Ditmarsch. *A simple proof of the completeness of APAL*, 2015.

# Take-home message

- Quantifying is fun
- Quantifying in DEL (usually) yields unexpected results
- APAL quantifies over PAL formulas that may include any propositional variables and can be of any arbitrary finite depth

**Open Problem**. Is there a finitary axiomatisation of APAL?