

Quantification in Dynamic Epistemic Logic Day 1

Rustam Galimullin & Louwe B. Kuijer

ESSLLI 2023

Hi.

This course

- Welcome to the “Quantification in Dynamic Epistemic Logic” course.
- I am Louwe Kuijer.
- I will be teaching this course together with Rustam Galimullin.

Table of Contents

- 1 Overview
- 2 Introduction
- 3 Information Change Done Systematically
- 4 Public announcements
- 5 Substitutions
- 6 Arrow Updates
- 7 Reduction axioms, expressivity and decidability
- 8 Update Expressivity
- 9 Conclusion

Course overview

- 5 days, 1 lecture each.
 - Day 1: Non-quantified DEL.
 - Day 2: APAL and friends.
 - Day 3: GAL and CAL.
 - Day 4: Group knowledge.
 - Day 5: AAML and AAUML.
- See course website for more details.
(Linked from Discord and ESLLI course catalogue.)

Further reading

- Most of this course is based directly on research papers (as opposed to textbooks and handbooks).
- As a result: not a lot of easy reading on this topic.
- Website does provide list of papers for further reading.
- But: expect those to be highly detailed and technical.

Exercises

- We have written some exercises that you can do to test yourself.
- They are, of course, completely optional.
- Solutions will not be published or discussed during the lectures.
- If you want to discuss the exercises: talk to us before or after the lecture.

Table of Contents

- 1 Overview
- 2 Introduction**
- 3 Information Change Done Systematically
- 4 Public announcements
- 5 Substitutions
- 6 Arrow Updates
- 7 Reduction axioms, expressivity and decidability
- 8 Update Expressivity
- 9 Conclusion

Epistemic logic

- Our starting point: epistemic logic (EL).
- Used to represent the information state of one or more agents *at a specific point in time*.

Epistemic logic: language

Definition

The *language of epistemic logic* (EL) is given by

$$\varphi ::= p \mid \neg\varphi \mid \varphi \vee \varphi \mid \Box_a\varphi$$

where $a \in A$ and $p \in P$.

Epistemic logic: language

Definition

The *language of epistemic logic* (EL) is given by

$$\varphi ::= p \mid \neg\varphi \mid \varphi \vee \psi \mid \Box_a\varphi$$

where $a \in A$ and $p \in P$.

- As usual: \wedge , \rightarrow , \leftrightarrow as abbreviations. Also: \Diamond as dual of \Box .

Epistemic logic: language

Definition

The *language of epistemic logic* (EL) is given by

$$\varphi ::= p \mid \neg\varphi \mid \varphi \vee \psi \mid \Box_a\varphi$$

where $a \in A$ and $p \in P$.

- As usual: \wedge , \rightarrow , \leftrightarrow as abbreviations. Also: \Diamond as dual of \Box .
- $\Box_a\varphi$ read as “agent a knows that φ (is true)”.
- $\Diamond_a\varphi$ read as “agent a considers it possible that φ (is true)”.

Epistemic logic: models

Definition

A *model* of epistemic logic is a triple $M = (S, \{R_a\}_{a \in A}, V)$ where

- S is a set of states (also called worlds),
- for each $a \in A$, $R_a \subseteq S \times S$ is an accessibility relations and
- $V : P \rightarrow 2^S$ is a valuation function.

Epistemic logic: models

Definition

A *model* of epistemic logic is a triple $M = (S, \{R_a\}_{a \in A}, V)$ where

- S is a set of states (also called worlds),
- for each $a \in A$, $R_a \subseteq S \times S$ is an accessibility relations and
- $V : P \rightarrow 2^S$ is a valuation function.

Note: in general, no reflexivity/transitivity/symmetry assumptions on R_a .

Epistemic logic: models

Definition

A *model* of epistemic logic is a triple $M = (S, \{R_a\}_{a \in A}, V)$ where

- S is a set of states (also called worlds),
- for each $a \in A$, $R_a \subseteq S \times S$ is an accessibility relations and
- $V : P \rightarrow 2^S$ is a valuation function.

Note: in general, no reflexivity/transitivity/symmetry assumptions on R_a .
When we do assume that the relation is an equivalence, write \sim_a for R_a .

Epistemic logic: semantics

Semantics are as usual.

Epistemic logic: semantics

Semantics are as usual.

Definition

The *satisfaction relation* \models is given by

$$\begin{aligned}
 M, s \models p & \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad s \in V(p), \\
 M, s \models \neg\varphi & \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad M, s \not\models \varphi, \\
 M, s \models \varphi \vee \psi & \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad M, s \models \varphi \text{ or } M, s \models \psi, \\
 M, s \models \Box_a\varphi & \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad \forall s' \in \mathcal{S}: \text{ if } (s, s') \in R_a \text{ then } M, s' \models \varphi.
 \end{aligned}$$

Example: cards (simple)

Situation:

- Agents: Rustam (r) and Louwe (l).
- Two cards from standard deck of playing cards, placed face down on table.
- We only care about whether the cards are red or black.

Example: cards (simple)

Situation:


- Agents: Rustam (r) and Louwe (l).
- Two cards from standard deck of playing cards, placed face down on table.
- We only care about whether the cards are red or black.

 r_1, r_2
 s_1
 $r_1, \neg r_2$
 s_2
 s_3
 $\neg r_1, r_2$
 s_4
 $\neg r_1, \neg r_2$

Example: cards (simple)

Situation:

- Agents: Rustam (r) and Louwe (l).
- Two cards from standard deck of playing cards, placed face down on table.
- We only care about whether the cards are red or black.



Information change

- Interesting thing about knowledge and information: they tend to change over time.

Information change

- Interesting thing about knowledge and information: they tend to change over time.
- Model represents specific information state.

Information change

- Interesting thing about knowledge and information: they tend to change over time.
- Model represents specific information state.
- Information change therefore requires model change.

Example: cards (still simple)

Situation:

- Card distribution as before.

Example: cards (still simple)

Situation:

- Card distribution as before.
- Now: I look at the first card, without showing it to Rustam.

Example: cards (still simple)

Situation:

- Card distribution as before.
- Now: I look at the first card, without showing it to Rustam.
- Set of worlds.

Example: cards (still simple)

Situation:

- Card distribution as before.
- Now: I look at the first card, without showing it to Rustam.
- Set of worlds.
- Arrows for Rustam.

r_1, r_2
 $\textcircled{s_1}$

$r_1, \neg r_2$
 $\textcircled{s_2}$


$\textcircled{s_3}$
 $\neg r_1, r_2$

$\textcircled{s_4}$
 $\neg r_1, \neg r_2$

Example: cards (still simple)

Situation:


- Card distribution as before.
- Now: I look at the first card, without showing it to Rustam.
- Set of worlds.
- Arrows for Rustam.



Example: cards (still simple)

Situation:


- Card distribution as before.
- Now: I look at the first card, without showing it to Rustam.
- Set of worlds.
- Arrows for Rustam.
- Arrows for Louwe.



Example: cards (still simple)

Situation:

- Card distribution as before.
- Now: I look at the first card, without showing it to Rustam.
- Set of worlds.
- Arrows for Rustam.
- Arrows for Louwe.



Getting to the point

- Oy, Louwe! Those examples are insultingly simple, why did you show them to us?

Getting to the point

- Oy, Louwe! Those examples are insultingly simple, why did you show them to us?
- Answer: while they are simple, there is a point to them.

Getting to the point

- Oy, Louwe! Those examples are insultingly simple, why did you show them to us?
- Answer: while they are simple, there is a point to them.
- Note that we *can* reason about information change using EL as opposed to DEL. (We just did.)
- But: it's relatively hard.

Reasoning about information change: EL vs. DEL

EL

Ad-hoc

Analyze twice

Lots of effort

Meta-logical

Table of Contents

- 1 Overview
- 2 Introduction
- 3 Information Change Done Systematically**
- 4 Public announcements
- 5 Substitutions
- 6 Arrow Updates
- 7 Reduction axioms, expressivity and decidability
- 8 Update Expressivity
- 9 Conclusion

Model transformers

- Suppose we want to do information change in a systematic way.
- How would we do this?

Model transformers

- Suppose we want to do information change in a systematic way.
- How would we do this?
- Take information changing event e .
- Effect of e is to change information state,

Model transformers

- Suppose we want to do information change in a systematic way.
- How would we do this?
- Take information changing event e .
- Effect of e is to change information state,
- Information state = pointed Kripke model.
- Initial model M_s turns into model $M * e_s$.

Model transformers

- Suppose we want to do information change in a systematic way.
- How would we do this?
- Take information changing event e .
- Effect of e is to change information state,
- Information state = pointed Kripke model.
- Initial model M_s turns into model $M * e_s$.
- In other words: e is a function that transforms models.

Updates as functions

- Let \mathfrak{M} be the class of pointed models.
- Event e is a function $e : \mathfrak{M} \rightarrow \mathfrak{M}$.

Updates as functions

- Let \mathfrak{M} be the class of pointed models.
- Event e is a function $e : \mathfrak{M} \rightarrow \mathfrak{M}$.
- (Actually: partial function.)

What does an update change?

- Left to do: define the behaviour of function e .

What does an update change?

- Left to do: define the behaviour of function e .
- Admittedly not a minor task.

What does an update change?

- Left to do: define the behaviour of function e .
- Admittedly not a minor task.
- First choice: what part of the model should e change?

What does an update change?

- Left to do: define the behaviour of function e .
- Admittedly not a minor task.
- First choice: what part of the model should e change?
- $M = (S, R, V)$.

What does an update change?

- Left to do: define the behaviour of function e .
- Admittedly not a minor task.
- First choice: what part of the model should e change?
- $M = (S, R, V)$.
- Option 1: event changes S : public announcement.

What does an update change?

- Left to do: define the behaviour of function e .
- Admittedly not a minor task.
- First choice: what part of the model should e change?
- $M = (S, R, V)$.
- Option 1: event changes S : public announcement.
- Option 2: event changes R_a : arrow updates.

What does an update change?

- Left to do: define the behaviour of function e .
- Admittedly not a minor task.
- First choice: what part of the model should e change?
- $M = (S, R, V)$.
- Option 1: event changes S : public announcement.
- Option 2: event changes R_a : arrow updates.
- Option 3: event changes V : substitutions.

What does an update change?

- Left to do: define the behaviour of function e .
- Admittedly not a minor task.
- First choice: what part of the model should e change?
- $M = (S, R, V)$.
- Option 1: event changes S : public announcement.
- Option 2: event changes R_a : arrow updates.
- Option 3: event changes V : substitutions.
- Option 4: all of the above: action models, arrow update models.
(Discussed later this week.)

Simplifying vs. “complexifying”

- Public announcements, arrow updates and substitution reduce, or at least do not increase, the complexity of a model.
- Action models and arrow update models do increase complexity.
- We start by considering the three simplifying update types.

Table of Contents

- 1 Overview
- 2 Introduction
- 3 Information Change Done Systematically
- 4 Public announcements**
- 5 Substitutions
- 6 Arrow Updates
- 7 Reduction axioms, expressivity and decidability
- 8 Update Expressivity
- 9 Conclusion

Public announcements

- Public announcements change a model by *restricting the set of worlds*.

Public announcements

- Public announcements change a model by *restricting the set of worlds*.
- Not just any restriction, though: must be definable.

Public announcements

- Public announcements change a model by *restricting the set of worlds*.
- Not just any restriction, though: must be definable.
- Specifically: announcement ψ restricts S to $S \cap \llbracket \psi \rrbracket_M$.

Public announcements: formally

Definition

Let $M = (S, R, V)$ be a model and ψ a formula. Then $M * \psi = (S * \psi, R * \psi, V * \psi)$ where

Public announcements: formally

Definition

Let $M = (S, R, V)$ be a model and ψ a formula. Then $M * \psi = (S * \psi, R * \psi, V * \psi)$ where

- $S * \psi = \{s \in S \mid M, s \models \psi\}$,

Public announcements: formally

Definition

Let $M = (S, R, V)$ be a model and ψ a formula. Then $M * \psi = (S * \psi, R * \psi, V * \psi)$ where

- $S * \psi = \{s \in S \mid M, s \models \psi\}$,
- $(R * \psi)_a = R_a \cap (S * \psi \times S * \psi)$,

Public announcements: formally


Definition

Let $M = (S, R, V)$ be a model and ψ a formula. Then $M * \psi = (S * \psi, R * \psi, V * \psi)$ where

- $S * \psi = \{s \in S \mid M, s \models \psi\}$,
- $(R * \psi)_a = R_a \cap (S * \psi \times S * \psi)$,
- $V * \psi(p) = V(p) \cap S * \psi$.


Public announcements: simple example

- Same cards example as before.




Public announcements: simple example

- Same cards example as before.
- Now, instead of privately looking at a card, I publicly show that the first card is red.




Public announcements: simple example

- Same cards example as before.
- Now, instead of privately looking at a card, I publicly show that the first card is red.
- Announcement: r_1 .




Public announcements: simple example

- Same cards example as before.
- Now, instead of privately looking at a card, I publicly show that the first card is red.
- Announcement: r_1 .



Public announcements: simple example

- Same cards example as before.
- Now, instead of privately looking at a card, I publicly show that the first card is red.
- Announcement: r_1 .



Not yet PAL

- Note: so far we have *not* defined Public Announcement Logic.
- No public announcement operator in the language yet!

Not yet PAL

- Note: so far we have *not* defined Public Announcement Logic.
- No public announcement operator in the language yet!
- But: we have already defined the function $[\psi] : \mathfrak{M} \rightarrow \mathfrak{M}$.
- So information change is already systematic.

Not yet PAL

- Note: so far we have *not* defined Public Announcement Logic.
- No public announcement operator in the language yet!
- But: we have already defined the function $[\psi] : \mathfrak{M} \rightarrow \mathfrak{M}$.
- So information change is already systematic.

EL	Not yet PAL
Ad-hoc	Systematic
Analyze twice	Analyze two things
Lots of effort	Easy(ish)
Meta-logical	Meta-logical

Not yet PAL

- Note: so far we have *not* defined Public Announcement Logic.
- No public announcement operator in the language yet!
- But: we have already defined the function $[\psi] : \mathfrak{M} \rightarrow \mathfrak{M}$.
- So information change is already systematic.

EL	Not yet PAL
Ad-hoc	Systematic
Analyze twice	Analyze two things
Lots of effort	Easy(ish)
Meta-logical	Meta-logical

- But eventually we do of course want to add announcements to the language.

Public Announcement Logic

Definition

The *language of public announcement logic* (PAL) is given by

$$\varphi ::= p \mid \neg\varphi \mid \varphi \vee \varphi \mid \Box_a\varphi \mid [\varphi]\varphi$$

where $a \in A$ and $p \in P$.

Public Announcement Logic

Definition

The *language of public announcement logic* (PAL) is given by

$$\varphi ::= p \mid \neg\varphi \mid \varphi \vee \varphi \mid \Box_a\varphi \mid [\varphi]\varphi$$

where $a \in A$ and $p \in P$.

- $\langle\varphi\rangle$ as dual of $[\varphi]$.

PAL: semantics

Definition

The *satisfaction relation* \models is extended with

$$M, s \models [\varphi]\psi \iff [\varphi](M, s) \models \psi$$

PAL: semantics

Definition

The *satisfaction relation* \models is extended with

$$M, s \models [\varphi]\psi \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad \text{if } [\varphi](M, s) \text{ exists then } [\varphi](M, s) \models \psi$$

PAL: semantics

Definition

The *satisfaction relation* \models is extended with

$$M, s \models [\varphi]\psi \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad \text{if } [\varphi](M, s) \text{ exists then } [\varphi](M, s) \models \psi$$

Equivalent to: $M, s \models [\varphi]\psi \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad \text{if } M, s \models \varphi \text{ then } M * [\varphi], s \models \psi.$

Ways to do information change

EL	Not yet PAL	PAL
Ad-hoc	Systematic	Systematic
Analyze twice	Analyze two things	Analyze two things
Lots of effort	Easy(ish)	Easy(ish)
Meta-logical	Meta-logical	In object language

Table of Contents

- 1 Overview
- 2 Introduction
- 3 Information Change Done Systematically
- 4 Public announcements
- 5 Substitutions**
- 6 Arrow Updates
- 7 Reduction axioms, expressivity and decidability
- 8 Update Expressivity
- 9 Conclusion

Next up: substitutions

- We have discussed public announcements.
- Arrow updates are more complicated, so we leave them for later.
- First, we discuss substitutions (a.k.a. assignments).

Factual change

- Public announcements change S .¹

Factual change

- Public announcements change S .¹

¹And, in a trivial way, R and V .

Factual change

- Public announcements change S .¹
- Arrow updates change R .

¹And, in a trivial way, R and V .

Factual change

- Public announcements change S .¹
- Arrow updates change R .
- Substitutions change V .

¹And, in a trivial way, R and V .

Factual change

- Public announcements change S .¹
- Arrow updates change R .
- Substitutions change V .
- This means that substitutions represent *factual change* instead of *information change*.

¹And, in a trivial way, R and V .

Factual change

- Public announcements change S .¹
- Arrow updates change R .
- Substitutions change V .
- This means that substitutions represent *factual change* instead of *information change*.
- This course is about information change, so we won't say much about substitutions.
- But we do briefly discuss them for the sake of completeness.

¹And, in a trivial way, R and V .

Substitutions

- Substitutions take form $[p_1 := \varphi_1, \dots, p_n := \varphi_n]$.

Substitutions

- Substitutions take form $[p_1 := \varphi_1, \dots, p_n := \varphi_n]$.
- Effect: atom $V(p_i)$ changes to $\llbracket \varphi_i \rrbracket_M$.

Substitutions

- Substitutions take form $[p_1 := \varphi_1, \dots, p_n := \varphi_n]$.
- Effect: atom $V(p_i)$ changes to $\llbracket \varphi_i \rrbracket_M$.
- Formally: let $\sigma = [p_1 := \varphi_1, \dots, p_n := \varphi_n]$. Then $M * \sigma = (S, R, V * \sigma)$ where

$$V * \sigma(p) = \begin{cases} \llbracket \varphi_i \rrbracket_M & \text{if } p = p_i \\ V(p) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$


Substitutions

- Substitutions take form $[p_1 := \varphi_1, \dots, p_n := \varphi_n]$.
- Effect: atom $V(p_i)$ changes to $\llbracket \varphi_i \rrbracket_M$.
- Formally: let $\sigma = [p_1 := \varphi_1, \dots, p_n := \varphi_n]$. Then $M * \sigma = (S, R, V * \sigma)$ where

$$V * \sigma(p) = \begin{cases} \llbracket \varphi_i \rrbracket_M & \text{if } p = p_i \\ V(p) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$


- Effect is global, i.e., common knowledge.

Substitutions: example 1




Substitutions: example 1

- Suppose I replace the first card by a black one.




Substitutions: example 1

- Suppose I replace the first card by a black one.
- Represented by $[r_1 := \perp]$




Substitutions: example 1

- Suppose I replace the first card by a black one.
- Represented by $[r_1 := \perp]$




Substitutions: example 2




Substitutions: example 2

- Suppose I switch around the two cards.




Substitutions: example 2

- Suppose I switch around the two cards.
- Represented by $[r_1 := r_2, r_2 := r_1]$



Substitutions: example 2

- Suppose I switch around the two cards.
- Represented by $[r_1 := r_2, r_2 := r_1]$



Substitutions in a logical language

Definition

The *language of epistemic logic with factual change* (EL+[σ]) is given by

$$\varphi ::= p \mid \neg\varphi \mid \varphi \vee \varphi \mid \Box_a\varphi \mid [\sigma]\varphi$$

$$\sigma ::= \epsilon \mid \sigma, p := \varphi$$

where $a \in A$, $p \in P$ and ϵ is the empty sequence.

Substitutions in a logical language

Definition

The *language of epistemic logic with factual change* (EL+[σ]) is given by

$$\varphi ::= p \mid \neg\varphi \mid \varphi \vee \varphi \mid \Box_a\varphi \mid [\sigma]\varphi$$

$$\sigma ::= \epsilon \mid \sigma, p := \varphi$$

where $a \in A$, $p \in P$ and ϵ is the empty sequence.

The *satisfaction relation* \models is extended with

$$M, s \models [\sigma]\varphi \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad [\sigma](M, s) \models \varphi$$

Substitutions in a logical language

Definition

The *language of epistemic logic with factual change* (EL+[σ]) is given by

$$\varphi ::= p \mid \neg\varphi \mid \varphi \vee \varphi \mid \Box_a\varphi \mid [\sigma]\varphi$$

$$\sigma ::= \epsilon \mid \sigma, p := \varphi$$

where $a \in A$, $p \in P$ and ϵ is the empty sequence.

The *satisfaction relation* \models is extended with

$$M, s \models [\sigma]\varphi \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad [\sigma](M, s) \models \varphi$$

where $[\sigma](M, s) = M * [\sigma], s$.

Systematic

- Note: as with PAL, we do not need substitutions in the language to do factual change systematically.
- But having them in the language still helps, by allowing in-logic reasoning.

Table of Contents

- 1 Overview
- 2 Introduction
- 3 Information Change Done Systematically
- 4 Public announcements
- 5 Substitutions
- 6 Arrow Updates**
- 7 Reduction axioms, expressivity and decidability
- 8 Update Expressivity
- 9 Conclusion

And now, arrow updates

- Finally, we arrive at arrow updates.

And now, arrow updates

- Finally, we arrive at arrow updates.
- I personally really like them.

And now, arrow updates

- Finally, we arrive at arrow updates.
- I personally really like them.
- But I must admit: they are rather complicated.

And now, arrow updates

- Finally, we arrive at arrow updates.
- I personally really like them.
- But I must admit: they are rather complicated.
- So before looking at the details: brief high level overview.

Introducing: arrow updates

- An information changing event is a public announcement if the following conditions are satisfied:

Introducing: arrow updates

- An information changing event is a public announcement if the following conditions are satisfied:
 - ① Information is gained, not lost.
 - ② All agents gain the same information.
 - ③ These three conditions are common knowledge.

Introducing: arrow updates

- An information changing event is a public announcement if the following conditions are satisfied:
 - ① Information is gained, not lost.
 - ② All agents gain the same information.
 - ③ These three conditions are common knowledge.
- Arrow updates relax the 2nd condition: agents may gain different information.
- As a result: not common knowledge what information is gained.

Introducing: arrow updates

- An information changing event is a public announcement if the following conditions are satisfied:
 - ① Information is gained, not lost.
 - ② All agents gain the same information.
 - ③ These three conditions are common knowledge.
- Arrow updates relax the 2nd condition: agents may gain different information.
- As a result: not common knowledge what information is gained.
- But: still required to be common knowledge what information is gained under what circumstances.

Arrow updates: example

- We already saw an example of an arrow update earlier.
- Recall: example of me looking at the first card.

Arrow updates: example

- We already saw an example of an arrow update earlier.
- Recall: example of me looking at the first card.
- Not all agents gain the same information (Rustam does not see the card, I do).

Arrow updates: example

- We already saw an example of an arrow update earlier.
- Recall: example of me looking at the first card.
- Not all agents gain the same information (Rustam does not see the card, I do).
- But Rustam does know the conditions for my information gain: if the card is read I will learn r_1 , if it is black I will learn $\neg r_1$.

Arrow updates: example

- We already saw an example of an arrow update earlier.
- Recall: example of me looking at the first card.
- Not all agents gain the same information (Rustam does not see the card, I do).
- But Rustam does know the conditions for my information gain: if the card is read I will learn r_1 , if it is black I will learn $\neg r_1$.
- Hence this is an arrow update.

Arrow updates: syntax

- An arrow update must specify what an agent will learn under what conditions.
- So three parts: condition, agent and information learned.

Arrow updates: syntax

- An arrow update must specify what an agent will learn under what conditions.
- So three parts: condition, agent and information learned.
- Left to decide: specify information learned as (i) what remains possible or (ii) what becomes impossible.
- With public announcements, we specify what remains possible ($[\varphi]$ means φ worlds remain).

Arrow updates: syntax

- An arrow update must specify what an agent will learn under what conditions.
- So three parts: condition, agent and information learned.
- Left to decide: specify information learned as (i) what remains possible or (ii) what becomes impossible.
- With public announcements, we specify what remains possible ($[\varphi]$ means φ worlds remain).
- We follow that convention for arrow updates.

Arrow updates: syntax (continued)

- Clauses of the form: $\varphi \xrightarrow{a} \psi$.
- Meaning: if φ is true, then from a 's point of view ψ remains possible.

Arrow updates: syntax (continued)

- Clauses of the form: $\varphi \xrightarrow{a} \psi$.
- Meaning: if φ is true, then from a 's point of view ψ remains possible.
- Semantically: $\varphi \xrightarrow{a} \psi$ means that a -arrow from φ world to ψ world is retained.

Arrow updates: syntax (continued)

- Clauses of the form: $\varphi \xrightarrow{a} \psi$.
- Meaning: if φ is true, then from a 's point of view ψ remains possible.
- Semantically: $\varphi \xrightarrow{a} \psi$ means that a -arrow from φ world to ψ world is retained.
- Arrow update consists of set of such clauses.

Arrow updates: syntax (continued)

- Clauses of the form: $\varphi \xrightarrow{a} \psi$.
- Meaning: if φ is true, then from a 's point of view ψ remains possible.
- Semantically: $\varphi \xrightarrow{a} \psi$ means that a -arrow from φ world to ψ world is retained.
- Arrow update consists of set of such clauses.
- Every arrow matching no clause is deleted.

Arrow updates: formally

Definition

The language of arrow update logic (AUL) is given by

$$\varphi ::= p \mid \neg\varphi \mid \varphi \vee \psi \mid \Box_a\varphi \mid [U]\varphi$$

$$U ::= \epsilon \mid U, \varphi \xrightarrow{a} \psi$$

where $a \in A$, $p \in P$ and ϵ is the empty sequence.

Arrow updates: semantics

- $M * [U] = (W, R * [U], V)$
- $(s_1, s_2) \in R * [U]_a$ iff $(s_1, s_2) \in R_a$ and
 $\exists(\varphi \xrightarrow{a} \psi) \in U : M, s_1 \models \varphi$ and $M, s_2 \models \psi$.

Satisfaction relation \models is extended with

- $M, s \models [U]\varphi$ iff $M * [U], s \models \varphi$.

Arrow updates: example part II

- Example of me looking at the first card,

Arrow updates: example part II

- Example of me looking at the first card,
- For Rustam: no change, i.e., in every situation every other situation remains possible.

Arrow updates: example part II

- Example of me looking at the first card,
- For Rustam: no change, i.e., in every situation every other situation remains possible.
- Clause: $\top \xrightarrow{r} \top$.

Arrow updates: example part II

- Example of me looking at the first card,
- For Rustam: no change, i.e., in every situation every other situation remains possible.
- Clause: $\top \xrightarrow{r} \top$.
- For me: if r_1 is true, then I learn that $\neg r_1$ is false, so r_1 is all that remains possible.

Arrow updates: example part II

- Example of me looking at the first card,
- For Rustam: no change, i.e., in every situation every other situation remains possible.
- Clause: $\top \xrightarrow{r} \top$.
- For me: if r_1 is true, then I learn that $\neg r_1$ is false, so r_1 is all that remains possible.
- Clause: $r_1 \xrightarrow{l} r_1$.

Arrow updates: example part II



- Example of me looking at the first card,
- For Rustam: no change, i.e., in every situation every other situation remains possible.
- Clause: $\top \xrightarrow{r} \top$.
- For me: if r_1 is true, then I learn that $\neg r_1$ is false, so r_1 is all that remains possible.
- Clause: $r_1 \xrightarrow{l} r_1$.
- Similarly: $\neg r_1 \xrightarrow{l} \neg r_1$.

Arrow updates: example part II

- Example of me looking at the first card,
- For Rustam: no change, i.e., in every situation every other situation remains possible.
- Clause: $\top \xrightarrow{r} \top$.
- For me: if r_1 is true, then I learn that $\neg r_1$ is false, so r_1 is all that remains possible.
- Clause: $r_1 \xrightarrow{l} r_1$.
- Similarly: $\neg r_1 \xrightarrow{l} \neg r_1$.
- No further clauses: update U given by $U = \{\top \xrightarrow{r} \top, r_1 \xrightarrow{l} r_1, \neg r_1 \xrightarrow{l} \neg r_1\}$.



Arrow updates: example part III

- We just established that $U = \{\top \xrightarrow{r} \top, r_1 \xrightarrow{l} r_1, \neg r_1 \xrightarrow{l} \neg r_1\}$.





Arrow updates: example part III

- We just established that $U = \{\top \xrightarrow{r} \top, r_1 \xrightarrow{l} r_1, \neg r_1 \xrightarrow{l} \neg r_1\}$.
- We know from before: model on the left should turn into model on the right.





Arrow updates: example part III

- We just established that $U = \{\top \xrightarrow{r} \top, r_1 \xrightarrow{l} r_1, \neg r_1 \xrightarrow{l} \neg r_1\}$.
- We know from before: model on the left should turn into model on the right.
- Let's see why this is so.





Arrow updates: example part III

- We just established that $U = \{\top \xrightarrow{r} \top, r_1 \xrightarrow{l} r_1, \neg r_1 \xrightarrow{l} \neg r_1\}$.
- We know from before: model on the left should turn into model on the right.
- Let's see why this is so.




Arrow updates: example part III

- We just established that $U = \{\top \xrightarrow{r} \top, r_1 \xrightarrow{l} r_1, \neg r_1 \xrightarrow{l} \neg r_1\}$.
- We know from before: model on the left should turn into model on the right.
- Let's see why this is so.




Arrow updates: example part III

- We just established that $U = \{\top \xrightarrow{r} \top, r_1 \xrightarrow{l} r_1, \neg r_1 \xrightarrow{l} \neg r_1\}$.
- We know from before: model on the left should turn into model on the right.
- Let's see why this is so.




Arrow updates: example part III

- We just established that $U = \{\top \xrightarrow{r} \top, r_1 \xrightarrow{l} r_1, \neg r_1 \xrightarrow{l} \neg r_1\}$.
- We know from before: model on the left should turn into model on the right.
- Let's see why this is so.




Arrow updates: example part III

- We just established that $U = \{\top \xrightarrow{r} \top, r_1 \xrightarrow{l} r_1, \neg r_1 \xrightarrow{l} \neg r_1\}$.
- We know from before: model on the left should turn into model on the right.
- Let's see why this is so.




Arrow updates: example part III

- We just established that $U = \{\top \xrightarrow{r} \top, r_1 \xrightarrow{l} r_1, \neg r_1 \xrightarrow{l} \neg r_1\}$.
- We know from before: model on the left should turn into model on the right.
- Let's see why this is so.




Arrow updates: example part III

- We just established that $U = \{\top \xrightarrow{r} \top, r_1 \xrightarrow{l} r_1, \neg r_1 \xrightarrow{l} \neg r_1\}$.
- We know from before: model on the left should turn into model on the right.
- Let's see why this is so.




Arrow updates: example part III

- We just established that $U = \{\top \xrightarrow{r} \top, r_1 \xrightarrow{l} r_1, \neg r_1 \xrightarrow{l} \neg r_1\}$.
- We know from before: model on the left should turn into model on the right.
- Let's see why this is so.



Arrow updates: example part III

- We just established that $U = \{\top \xrightarrow{r} \top, r_1 \xrightarrow{l} r_1, \neg r_1 \xrightarrow{l} \neg r_1\}$.
- We know from before: model on the left should turn into model on the right.
- Let's see why this is so.



Arrow updates: example part III

- We just established that $U = \{\top \xrightarrow{r} \top, r_1 \xrightarrow{l} r_1, \neg r_1 \xrightarrow{l} \neg r_1\}$.
- We know from before: model on the left should turn into model on the right.
- Let's see why this is so.





Table of Contents

- 1 Overview
- 2 Introduction
- 3 Information Change Done Systematically
- 4 Public announcements
- 5 Substitutions
- 6 Arrow Updates
- 7 Reduction axioms, expressivity and decidability**
- 8 Update Expressivity
- 9 Conclusion

Axiomatization

- In a moment, we'll discuss axiomatizations for DEL.

Axiomatization

- In a moment, we'll discuss axiomatizations for DEL.
- First, however, brief reminder of axiomatization for EL.

Axiomatization

- In a moment, we'll discuss axiomatizations for DEL.
- First, however, brief reminder of axiomatization for EL.
- Well known proof system **K**:
 - (Prop) Any substitution instance of a validity of propositional logic
 - (K) $\Box(\phi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow (\Box\phi \rightarrow \Box\psi)$
 - (Nec) From $\vdash \phi$, infer $\vdash \Box\phi$
 - (MP) From $\phi \rightarrow \psi$ and ϕ , infer ψ

Completeness

- Proof in \mathbf{K} is a finite, numbered list of formulas.
- Each line in proof is justified by (1) being a premise, (2) an axiom of \mathbf{K} or (3) applying a rule of \mathbf{K} to earlier line(s).

Completeness

- Proof in \mathbf{K} is a finite, numbered list of formulas.
- Each line in proof is justified by (1) being a premise, (2) an axiom of \mathbf{K} or (3) applying a rule of \mathbf{K} to earlier line(s).
- Notation $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$.

Completeness

- Proof in \mathbf{K} is a finite, numbered list of formulas.
- Each line in proof is justified by (1) being a premise, (2) an axiom of \mathbf{K} or (3) applying a rule of \mathbf{K} to earlier line(s).
- Notation $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$.
- Famously, \mathbf{K} is sound and strongly complete.

Completeness

- Proof in \mathbf{K} is a finite, numbered list of formulas.
- Each line in proof is justified by (1) being a premise, (2) an axiom of \mathbf{K} or (3) applying a rule of \mathbf{K} to earlier line(s).
- Notation $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$.
- Famously, \mathbf{K} is sound and strongly complete.
- So, in some sense, all there is to know about basic modal logic.

Predictable

- Public announcements, arrow updates and substitutions change agents' knowledge.

Predictable

- Public announcements, arrow updates and substitutions change agents' knowledge.
- But: the old situation determines the new one.
- So it is unsurprising that whether φ holds in the new situation can be predicted from the old one.

Predictable

- Public announcements, arrow updates and substitutions change agents' knowledge.
- But: the old situation determines the new one.
- So it is unsurprising that whether φ holds in the new situation can be predicted from the old one.
- These predictions can be encoded as axioms.

Axioms for Substitutions

- The axioms for substitutions are the easiest. So we start with those.

Axioms for Substitutions

- The axioms for substitutions are the easiest. So we start with those.
- $[p := \varphi]$ sets value of p to value of φ . Hence $M * [p := \varphi], w \models p$ iff $M, w \models \varphi$.

Axioms for Substitutions

- The axioms for substitutions are the easiest. So we start with those.
- $[p := \varphi]$ sets value of p to value of φ . Hence $M * [p := \varphi], w \models p$ iff $M, w \models \varphi$.
- Result $\models [p := \varphi]p \leftrightarrow \varphi$.

Axioms for Substitutions

- The axioms for substitutions are the easiest. So we start with those.
- $[p := \varphi]$ sets value of p to value of φ . Hence $M * [p := \varphi], w \models p$ iff $M, w \models \varphi$.
- Result $\models [p := \varphi]p \leftrightarrow \varphi$.
- If σ doesn't assign a value to p then $\models [\sigma]p \leftrightarrow p$.

Axioms for Substitutions (II)

- Recall that, in modal logic, $\Box_a \neg \varphi \leftrightarrow \neg \Box_a \varphi$ characterizes *functionality* of accessibility relation.

Axioms for Substitutions (II)

- Recall that, in modal logic, $\Box_a \neg \varphi \leftrightarrow \neg \Box_a \varphi$ characterizes *functionality* of accessibility relation.
- This is because if there is only one successor, then either all successors satisfy φ or no successors satisfy φ .

Axioms for Substitutions (II)

- Recall that, in modal logic, $\Box_a \neg \varphi \leftrightarrow \neg \Box_a \varphi$ characterizes *functionality* of accessibility relation.
- This is because if there is only one successor, then either all successors satisfy φ or no successors satisfy φ .
- The update $[\sigma]$, considered as a model transformer, is also a function.

Axioms for Substitutions (II)

- Recall that, in modal logic, $\Box_a \neg \varphi \leftrightarrow \neg \Box_a \varphi$ characterizes *functionality* of accessibility relation.
- This is because if there is only one successor, then either all successors satisfy φ or no successors satisfy φ .
- The update $[\sigma]$, considered as a model transformer, is also a function.
- Hence: $\models [\sigma] \neg \varphi \leftrightarrow \neg [\sigma] \varphi$.

Axioms for Substitutions (II)

- Recall that, in modal logic, $\Box_a \neg \varphi \leftrightarrow \neg \Box_a \varphi$ characterizes *functionality* of accessibility relation.
- This is because if there is only one successor, then either all successors satisfy φ or no successors satisfy φ .
- The update $[\sigma]$, considered as a model transformer, is also a function.
- Hence: $\models [\sigma] \neg \varphi \leftrightarrow \neg [\sigma] \varphi$.
- Similarly: $\models [\sigma] (\varphi \vee \psi) \leftrightarrow ([\sigma] \varphi \vee [\sigma] \psi)$.

Axioms for Substitutions (III)

- Finally: substitutions are public and do not affect distinguishability of worlds.

Axioms for Substitutions (III)

- Finally: substitutions are public and do not affect distinguishability of worlds.
- This implies that $\models [\sigma]\Box_a\varphi \leftrightarrow \Box_a[\sigma]\varphi$.

Axioms for Substitutions (IV)

Putting it all together:

$$[\sigma]p \leftrightarrow \varphi$$

$$[\sigma]p \leftrightarrow p$$

$$[\sigma]\neg\varphi \leftrightarrow \neg[\sigma]\varphi$$

$$[\sigma](\varphi \vee \psi) \leftrightarrow ([\sigma]\varphi \vee [\sigma]\psi)$$

$$[\sigma]\Box_a\varphi \leftrightarrow \Box_a[\sigma]\varphi$$

where $p := \varphi$ in σ

where p is not assigned a value in σ

are sound axioms.

Reduction axioms

$$[\sigma]p \leftrightarrow \varphi$$

$$[\sigma]p \leftrightarrow p$$

$$[\sigma]\neg\varphi \leftrightarrow \neg[\sigma]\varphi$$

$$[\sigma](\varphi \vee \psi) \leftrightarrow ([\sigma]\varphi \vee [\sigma]\psi)$$

$$[\sigma]\Box_a\varphi \leftrightarrow \Box_a[\sigma]\varphi$$

where $p := \varphi$ in σ

where p is not assigned a value in σ

Reduction axioms

$$[\sigma]p \leftrightarrow \varphi$$

where $p := \varphi$ in σ

$$[\sigma]p \leftrightarrow p$$

where p is not assigned a value in σ

$$[\sigma]\neg\varphi \leftrightarrow \neg[\sigma]\varphi$$

$$[\sigma](\varphi \vee \psi) \leftrightarrow ([\sigma]\varphi \vee [\sigma]\psi)$$

$$[\sigma]\Box_a\varphi \leftrightarrow \Box_a[\sigma]\varphi$$

- Important property: in each axiom right-hand side has less complex formula inside scope of $[\sigma]$.

Reduction axioms

$$[\sigma]p \leftrightarrow \varphi$$

where $p := \varphi$ in σ

$$[\sigma]p \leftrightarrow p$$

where p is not assigned a value in σ

$$[\sigma]\neg\varphi \leftrightarrow \neg[\sigma]\varphi$$

$$[\sigma](\varphi \vee \psi) \leftrightarrow ([\sigma]\varphi \vee [\sigma]\psi)$$

$$[\sigma]\Box_a\varphi \leftrightarrow \Box_a[\sigma]\varphi$$

- Important property: in each axiom right-hand side has less complex formula inside scope of $[\sigma]$.

Reduction axioms

$$[\sigma]p \leftrightarrow \varphi$$

where $p := \varphi$ in σ

$$[\sigma]p \leftrightarrow p$$

where p is not assigned a value in σ

$$[\sigma]\neg\varphi \leftrightarrow \neg[\sigma]\varphi$$

$$[\sigma](\varphi \vee \psi) \leftrightarrow ([\sigma]\varphi \vee [\sigma]\psi)$$

$$[\sigma]\Box_a\varphi \leftrightarrow \Box_a[\sigma]\varphi$$

- Important property: in each axiom right-hand side has less complex formula inside scope of $[\sigma]$.

Reduction axioms

$$[\sigma]p \leftrightarrow \varphi$$

where $p := \varphi$ in σ

$$[\sigma]p \leftrightarrow p$$

where p is not assigned a value in σ

$$[\sigma]\neg\varphi \leftrightarrow \neg[\sigma]\varphi$$

$$[\sigma](\varphi \vee \psi) \leftrightarrow ([\sigma]\varphi \vee [\sigma]\psi)$$

$$[\sigma]\Box_a\varphi \leftrightarrow \Box_a[\sigma]\varphi$$

- Important property: in each axiom right-hand side has less complex formula inside scope of $[\sigma]$.

Reduction axioms

$$[\sigma]p \leftrightarrow \varphi$$

where $p := \varphi$ in σ

$$[\sigma]p \leftrightarrow p$$

where p is not assigned a value in σ

$$[\sigma]\neg\varphi \leftrightarrow \neg[\sigma]\varphi$$

$$[\sigma](\varphi \vee \psi) \leftrightarrow ([\sigma]\varphi \vee [\sigma]\psi)$$

$$[\sigma]\Box_a\varphi \leftrightarrow \Box_a[\sigma]\varphi$$

- Important property: in each axiom right-hand side has less complex formula inside scope of $[\sigma]$.

Reduction axioms

$$[\sigma]p \leftrightarrow \varphi$$

where $p := \varphi$ in σ

$$[\sigma]p \leftrightarrow p$$

where p is not assigned a value in σ

$$[\sigma]\neg\varphi \leftrightarrow \neg[\sigma]\varphi$$

$$[\sigma](\varphi \vee \psi) \leftrightarrow ([\sigma]\varphi \vee [\sigma]\psi)$$

$$[\sigma]\Box_a\varphi \leftrightarrow \Box_a[\sigma]\varphi$$

- Important property: in each axiom right-hand side has less complex formula inside scope of $[\sigma]$.
- Consequence: every formula with $[\sigma]$ is provably equivalent to one without.

Using reduction axioms

- Example: $[p := [q := \Box_a \neg p](p \vee q)]\Box_b \neg p$.

Using reduction axioms

- Example: $[\sigma]\Box_b\neg p$.

Using reduction axioms

- Example: $[\sigma]\Box_b\neg p$.
- $\Box_b[\sigma]\neg p$

Using reduction axioms

- Example: $[\sigma]\Box_b\neg p$.
- $\Box_b[\sigma]\neg p$
- $\Box_b\neg[\sigma]p$

Using reduction axioms

- Example: $[p := [q := \Box_a \neg p](p \vee q)]\Box_b \neg p$.
- $\Box_b[\sigma]\neg p$
- $\Box_b\neg[\sigma]p$

Using reduction axioms

- Example: $[p := [q := \Box_a \neg p](p \vee q)]\Box_b \neg p$.
- $\Box_b[\sigma]\neg p$
- $\Box_b \neg[p := [q := \Box_a \neg p](p \vee q)]p$

Using reduction axioms

- Example: $[p := [q := \Box_a \neg p](p \vee q)]\Box_b \neg p$.
- $\Box_b[\sigma] \neg p$
- $\Box_b \neg [p := [q := \Box_a \neg p](p \vee q)]p$
- $\Box_b \neg [q := \Box_a \neg p](p \vee q)$

Using reduction axioms

- Example: $[p := [q := \Box_a \neg p](p \vee q)]\Box_b \neg p$.
- $\Box_b[\sigma]\neg p$
- $\Box_b \neg[p := [q := \Box_a \neg p](p \vee q)]p$
- $\Box_b \neg[q := \Box_a \neg p](p \vee q)$
- $\Box_b \neg([q := \Box_a \neg p]p \vee [q := \Box_a \neg p]q)$

Using reduction axioms

- Example: $[p := [q := \Box_a \neg p](p \vee q)]\Box_b \neg p$.
- $\Box_b[\sigma]\neg p$
- $\Box_b \neg[p := [q := \Box_a \neg p](p \vee q)]p$
- $\Box_b \neg[q := \Box_a \neg p](p \vee q)$
- $\Box_b \neg([q := \Box_a \neg p]p \vee [q := \Box_a \neg p]q)$
- $\Box_b \neg(p \vee [q := \Box_a \neg p]q)$

Using reduction axioms

- Example: $[p := [q := \Box_a \neg p](p \vee q)]\Box_b \neg p$.
- $\Box_b[\sigma]\neg p$
- $\Box_b \neg [p := [q := \Box_a \neg p](p \vee q)]p$
- $\Box_b \neg [q := \Box_a \neg p](p \vee q)$
- $\Box_b \neg ([q := \Box_a \neg p]p \vee [q := \Box_a \neg p]q)$
- $\Box_b \neg (p \vee [q := \Box_a \neg p]q)$
- $\Box_b \neg (p \vee \Box_a \neg p)$

The many uses of reduction axioms

Reduction axioms are nice because:

The many uses of reduction axioms

Reduction axioms are nice because:

- 1 “Free” completeness: axiomatization for $EL + \text{reduction axioms for } [\sigma] = \text{axiomatization for } EL + [\sigma]$.

The many uses of reduction axioms

Reduction axioms are nice because:

- 1 “Free” completeness: axiomatization for $EL + \text{reduction axioms for } [\sigma] = \text{axiomatization for } EL + [\sigma]$.
- 2 “Free” expressivity results: $EL + [\sigma]$ formulas are equivalent to EL formulas.

The many uses of reduction axioms

Reduction axioms are nice because:

- 1 “Free” completeness: axiomatization for $EL + \text{reduction axioms for } [\sigma] = \text{axiomatization for } EL+[\sigma]$.
- 2 “Free” expressivity results: $EL+[\sigma]$ formulas are equivalent to EL formulas.
- 3 “Free” decidability: satisfiability of $EL+[\sigma]$ reduces to satisfiability of EL .

Axioms for public announcements

- We can do the same for public announcements.
- Small complication: $[\varphi]$ is a partial function. To compensate: add a bunch of $\varphi \rightarrow \dots$ conditions.

Axioms for public announcements

- We can do the same for public announcements.
- Small complication: $[\varphi]$ is a partial function. To compensate: add a bunch of $\varphi \rightarrow \dots$ conditions.
- $\models [\varphi]p \leftrightarrow (\varphi \rightarrow p)$

Axioms for public announcements

- We can do the same for public announcements.
- Small complication: $[\varphi]$ is a partial function. To compensate: add a bunch of $\varphi \rightarrow \dots$ conditions.
- $\models [\varphi]p \leftrightarrow (\varphi \rightarrow p)$
- $\models [\varphi]\neg\psi \leftrightarrow (\varphi \rightarrow \neg[\varphi]\psi)$

Axioms for public announcements

- We can do the same for public announcements.
- Small complication: $[\varphi]$ is a partial function. To compensate: add a bunch of $\varphi \rightarrow \dots$ conditions.
- $\models [\varphi]p \leftrightarrow (\varphi \rightarrow p)$
- $\models [\varphi]\neg\psi \leftrightarrow (\varphi \rightarrow \neg[\varphi]\psi)$
- $\models [\varphi](\psi_1 \vee \psi_2) \leftrightarrow ([\varphi]\psi_1 \vee [\varphi]\psi_2)$

Axioms for public announcements

- We can do the same for public announcements.
- Small complication: $[\varphi]$ is a partial function. To compensate: add a bunch of $\varphi \rightarrow \dots$ conditions.
- $\models [\varphi]p \leftrightarrow (\varphi \rightarrow p)$
- $\models [\varphi]\neg\psi \leftrightarrow (\varphi \rightarrow \neg[\varphi]\psi)$
- $\models [\varphi](\psi_1 \vee \psi_2) \leftrightarrow ([\varphi]\psi_1 \vee [\varphi]\psi_2)$
- $\models [\varphi]\Box_a\psi \leftrightarrow (\varphi \rightarrow \Box_a[\varphi]\psi)$

Axioms for arrow updates

- Most axioms for arrow updates are simpler.

Axioms for arrow updates

- Most axioms for arrow updates are simpler.
- $\models [U]p \leftrightarrow p$
- $\models [U]\neg\varphi \leftrightarrow \neg[U]\varphi$
- $\models [U](\varphi \vee \psi) \leftrightarrow ([U]\varphi \vee [U]\psi)$

Axioms for arrow updates

- Most axioms for arrow updates are simpler.
- $\models [U]p \leftrightarrow p$
- $\models [U]\neg\varphi \leftrightarrow \neg[U]\varphi$
- $\models [U](\varphi \vee \psi) \leftrightarrow ([U]\varphi \vee [U]\psi)$
- Final axioms is more complicated, however.

Axioms for arrow updates

- Most axioms for arrow updates are simpler.
- $\models [U]p \leftrightarrow p$
- $\models [U]\neg\varphi \leftrightarrow \neg[U]\varphi$
- $\models [U](\varphi \vee \psi) \leftrightarrow ([U]\varphi \vee [U]\psi)$
- Final axioms is more complicated, however.
- $\models [U]\Box_a\varphi \leftrightarrow \bigwedge_{(\psi_1, a, \psi_2) \in U} (\psi_1 \rightarrow \Box_a(\psi_2 \rightarrow [U]\varphi))$

Reduction axioms for PAL and AUL

- Again: these are reduction axioms.
- Therefore, “free” completeness, expressivity, decidability.

Reduction axioms for PAL and AUL

- Again: these are reduction axioms.
- Therefore, “free” completeness, expressivity, decidability.
- In particular: note that EL, PAL, AUL and $EL + [\sigma]$ all have the same expressivity.

Reduction axioms for PAL and AUL

- Again: these are reduction axioms.
- Therefore, “free” completeness, expressivity, decidability.
- In particular: note that EL, PAL, AUL and $EL+[\sigma]$ all have the same expressivity.
- This is somewhat surprising: PAL, AUL and $EL+[\sigma]$ *feel* more powerful than EL.

Reduction axioms for PAL and AUL

- Again: these are reduction axioms.
- Therefore, “free” completeness, expressivity, decidability.
- In particular: note that EL, PAL, AUL and $EL+[\sigma]$ all have the same expressivity.
- This is somewhat surprising: PAL, AUL and $EL+[\sigma]$ *feel* more powerful than EL.
- And they are more powerful, in some sense. Just not in expressivity.

Table of Contents

- 1 Overview
- 2 Introduction
- 3 Information Change Done Systematically
- 4 Public announcements
- 5 Substitutions
- 6 Arrow Updates
- 7 Reduction axioms, expressivity and decidability
- 8 Update Expressivity**
- 9 Conclusion

Comparing the four logics

- In previous section we saw: EL, EL+[σ], PAL, AUL all have same expressivity.

Comparing the four logics

- In previous section we saw: EL, EL+[σ], PAL, AUL all have same expressivity.
- I.e., for every formula φ in one language there is an equivalent formula φ' in other language.

Comparing the four logics

- In previous section we saw: EL, EL+[σ], PAL, AUL all have same expressivity.
- I.e., for every formula φ in one language there is an equivalent formula φ' in other language.
- So why do we bother?

Comparing the four logics

- In previous section we saw: EL, EL+[σ], PAL, AUL all have same expressivity.
- I.e., for every formula φ in one language there is an equivalent formula φ' in other language.
- So why do we bother?
- If [σ], [φ], [U] don't add expressivity, do they add something fundamentally new?

Comparing the four logics

- In previous section we saw: EL, EL+[σ], PAL, AUL all have same expressivity.
- I.e., for every formula φ in one language there is an equivalent formula φ' in other language.
- So why do we bother?
- If [σ], [φ], [U] don't add expressivity, do they add something fundamentally new?
- Three reasons.

Comparing the four logics

- In previous section we saw: EL, EL+[σ], PAL, AUL all have same expressivity.
- I.e., for every formula φ in one language there is an equivalent formula φ' in other language.
- So why do we bother?
- If [σ], [φ], [U] don't add expressivity, do they add something fundamentally new?
- Three reasons.
 - ① Succinctness. The equivalent formula in EL is typically longer.

Comparing the four logics

- In previous section we saw: EL, EL+[σ], PAL, AUL all have same expressivity.
- I.e., for every formula φ in one language there is an equivalent formula φ' in other language.
- So why do we bother?
- If [σ], [φ], [U] don't add expressivity, do they add something fundamentally new?
- Three reasons.
 - ① Succinctness. The equivalent formula in EL is typically longer.
 - ② We can add quantification. (The main point of this course!)

Comparing the four logics

- In previous section we saw: EL, EL+[σ], PAL, AUL all have same expressivity.
- I.e., for every formula φ in one language there is an equivalent formula φ' in other language.
- So why do we bother?
- If [σ], [φ], [U] don't add expressivity, do they add something fundamentally new?
- Three reasons.
 - ① Succinctness. The equivalent formula in EL is typically longer.
 - ② We can add quantification. (The main point of this course!)
 - ③ While they have the same expressivity, their *update expressivity* differs.

Update Expressivity

- Expressivity (the normal kind) is about which sets of pointed models can be expressed, i.e., given class X of pointed models, is there a formula φ such that $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket = X$?

Update Expressivity

- Expressivity (the normal kind) is about which sets of pointed models can be expressed, i.e., given class X of pointed models, is there a formula φ such that $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket = X$?
- *Update* expressivity is about which model transformers can be expressed.

Update Expressivity

- Expressivity (the normal kind) is about which sets of pointed models can be expressed, i.e., given class X of pointed models, is there a formula φ such that $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket = X$?
- *Update* expressivity is about which model transformers can be expressed.
- Given a function $f : \mathfrak{M} \rightarrow \mathfrak{M}$, is there an update e in the language such that $\llbracket e \rrbracket = f$?

A first attempt

First attempt at a definition:

Definition

Let \mathcal{L}_1 and \mathcal{L}_2 be languages with associated sets E_1 and E_2 of updates.

A first attempt

First attempt at a definition:

Definition

Let \mathcal{L}_1 and \mathcal{L}_2 be languages with associated sets E_1 and E_2 of updates. We say that the *update expressivity* of \mathcal{L}_1 is at least as great as that of \mathcal{L}_2 if:

A first attempt

First attempt at a definition:

Definition

Let \mathcal{L}_1 and \mathcal{L}_2 be languages with associated sets E_1 and E_2 of updates. We say that the *update expressivity* of \mathcal{L}_1 is at least as great as that of \mathcal{L}_2 if:

For every $e_1 \in E_1$ there is an $e_2 \in E_2$ s.t. $e_1 = e_2$.

A first attempt

First attempt at a definition:

Definition

Let \mathcal{L}_1 and \mathcal{L}_2 be languages with associated sets E_1 and E_2 of updates. We say that the *update expressivity* of \mathcal{L}_1 is at least as great as that of \mathcal{L}_2 if:

For every $e_1 \in E_1$ there is an $e_2 \in E_2$ s.t. $e_1 = e_2$.

Problem 1: equality too strong.

A second attempt

Definition

Let $e_1 : \mathfrak{M} \rightarrow \mathfrak{M}$ and $e_2 : \mathfrak{M} \rightarrow \mathfrak{M}$ be given. We say that e_1 and e_2 are equivalent, denoted $e_1 \sim e_2$ if for all M, w ,

Definition

A second attempt

Definition

Let $e_1 : \mathfrak{M} \rightarrow \mathfrak{M}$ and $e_2 : \mathfrak{M} \rightarrow \mathfrak{M}$ be given. We say that e_1 and e_2 are equivalent, denoted $e_1 \sim e_2$ if for all M, w , the models $e_1(M, w)$ and $e_2(M, w)$ are bisimilar.

Definition

A second attempt

Definition

Let $e_1 : \mathfrak{M} \rightarrow \mathfrak{M}$ and $e_2 : \mathfrak{M} \rightarrow \mathfrak{M}$ be given. We say that e_1 and e_2 are equivalent, denoted $e_1 \sim e_2$ if for all M, w , the models $e_1(M, w)$ and $e_2(M, w)$ are bisimilar.

Definition

Let \mathcal{L}_1 and \mathcal{L}_2 be languages with associated sets E_1 and E_2 of updates. We say that the *update expressivity* of \mathcal{L}_1 is at least as great as that of \mathcal{L}_2 if:

A second attempt

Definition

Let $e_1 : \mathfrak{M} \rightarrow \mathfrak{M}$ and $e_2 : \mathfrak{M} \rightarrow \mathfrak{M}$ be given. We say that e_1 and e_2 are equivalent, denoted $e_1 \sim e_2$ if for all M, w , the models $e_1(M, w)$ and $e_2(M, w)$ are bisimilar.

Definition

Let \mathcal{L}_1 and \mathcal{L}_2 be languages with associated sets E_1 and E_2 of updates. We say that the *update expressivity* of \mathcal{L}_1 is at least as great as that of \mathcal{L}_2 if:

For every $e_1 \in E_1$ there is an $e_2 \in E_2$ such that $e_1 \sim e_2$.

A second attempt

Definition

Let $e_1 : \mathfrak{M} \rightarrow \mathfrak{M}$ and $e_2 : \mathfrak{M} \rightarrow \mathfrak{M}$ be given. We say that e_1 and e_2 are equivalent, denoted $e_1 \sim e_2$ if for all M, w , the models $e_1(M, w)$ and $e_2(M, w)$ are bisimilar.

Definition

Let \mathcal{L}_1 and \mathcal{L}_2 be languages with associated sets E_1 and E_2 of updates. We say that the *update expressivity* of \mathcal{L}_1 is at least as great as that of \mathcal{L}_2 if:

For every $e_1 \in E_1$ there is an $e_2 \in E_2$ such that $e_1 \sim e_2$.

Problem 2: public announcements are partial functions, not functions.

Update expressivity: the definition

Definition

Let $e_1 : \mathfrak{M} \rightarrow \mathfrak{M}$ and $e_2 : \mathfrak{M} \rightarrow \mathfrak{M}$ be given. We say that e_2 dominates e_1 , denoted $e_1 \rightsquigarrow e_2$ if for all M, w ,

Definition

Update expressivity: the definition

Definition

Let $e_1 : \mathfrak{M} \rightarrow \mathfrak{M}$ and $e_2 : \mathfrak{M} \rightarrow \mathfrak{M}$ be given. We say that e_2 dominates e_1 , denoted $e_1 \rightsquigarrow e_2$ if for all M, w , if $e_1(M, w)$ exists, then $e_2(M, w)$ exists and the two pointed models are bisimilar.

Definition

Update expressivity: the definition

Definition

Let $e_1 : \mathfrak{M} \rightarrow \mathfrak{M}$ and $e_2 : \mathfrak{M} \rightarrow \mathfrak{M}$ be given. We say that e_2 dominates e_1 , denoted $e_1 \rightsquigarrow e_2$ if for all M, w , if $e_1(M, w)$ exists, then $e_2(M, w)$ exists and the two pointed models are bisimilar.

Definition

Let \mathcal{L}_1 and \mathcal{L}_2 be languages with associated sets E_1 and E_2 of updates. We say that the *update expressivity* of \mathcal{L}_1 is at least as great as that of \mathcal{L}_2 , denoted $\mathcal{L}_1 \preceq \mathcal{L}_2$ if:

Update expressivity: the definition

Definition

Let $e_1 : \mathfrak{M} \rightarrow \mathfrak{M}$ and $e_2 : \mathfrak{M} \rightarrow \mathfrak{M}$ be given. We say that e_2 dominates e_1 , denoted $e_1 \rightsquigarrow e_2$ if for all M, w , if $e_1(M, w)$ exists, then $e_2(M, w)$ exists and the two pointed models are bisimilar.

Definition

Let \mathcal{L}_1 and \mathcal{L}_2 be languages with associated sets E_1 and E_2 of updates. We say that the *update expressivity* of \mathcal{L}_1 is at least as great as that of \mathcal{L}_2 , denoted $\mathcal{L}_1 \preceq \mathcal{L}_2$ if:

For every $e_1 \in E_1$ there is an $e_2 \in E_2$ such that $e_1 \rightsquigarrow e_2$.

Comparing update expressivity

PAL

AUL

EL+[σ]

EL

Comparing update expressivity

- All three update logics clearly have higher update expressivity than EL.

PAL


AUL

EL+[σ]

EL


Comparing update expressivity

- All three update logics clearly have higher update expressivity than EL.




Comparing update expressivity

- All three update logics clearly have higher update expressivity than EL.
- $EL+[\sigma]$ is incomparable with PAL and AUL.




Comparing update expressivity

- All three update logics clearly have higher update expressivity than EL.
- $EL+[\sigma]$ is incomparable with PAL and AUL.
- But: $[\top \stackrel{A}{\mapsto} \varphi] \rightsquigarrow [\varphi]$, so $PAL \preceq AUL$.



Comparing update expressivity

- All three update logics clearly have higher update expressivity than EL.
- $EL+[\sigma]$ is incomparable with PAL and AUL.
- But: $[\top \stackrel{A}{\mapsto} \varphi] \rightsquigarrow [\varphi]$, so $PAL \preceq AUL$.
- No translation from arrow updates to public announcements. Therefore: $PAL \prec AUL$.



Comparing update expressivity

- All three update logics clearly have higher update expressivity than EL.
- $EL+[\sigma]$ is incomparable with PAL and AUL.
- But: $[\top \stackrel{A}{\mapsto} \varphi] \rightsquigarrow [\varphi]$, so $PAL \preceq AUL$.
- No translation from arrow updates to public announcements. Therefore: $PAL \prec AUL$.




Table of Contents

- 1 Overview
- 2 Introduction
- 3 Information Change Done Systematically
- 4 Public announcements
- 5 Substitutions
- 6 Arrow Updates
- 7 Reduction axioms, expressivity and decidability
- 8 Update Expressivity
- 9 Conclusion**

Summary

Today's overall message:

Summary

Today's overall message:

- Public announcements, arrow updates and substitutions change S , R and V , respectively.

Summary

Today's overall message:

- Public announcements, arrow updates and substitutions change S , R and V , respectively.
- Updates can be seen both as functions $e : \mathfrak{M} \rightarrow \mathfrak{M}$ and as linguistic objects.

Summary

Today's overall message:

- Public announcements, arrow updates and substitutions change S , R and V , respectively.
- Updates can be seen both as functions $e : \mathfrak{M} \rightarrow \mathfrak{M}$ and as linguistic objects.
- Existence of reduction axioms shows that EL, EL+[σ], PAL and AUL have same expressivity and are decidable.

Summary

Today's overall message:

- Public announcements, arrow updates and substitutions change S , R and V , respectively.
- Updates can be seen both as functions $e : \mathfrak{M} \rightarrow \mathfrak{M}$ and as linguistic objects.
- Existence of reduction axioms shows that EL, EL+[σ], PAL and AUL have same expressivity and are decidable.
- But: the four logics have different update expressivity.